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BANKS AND BANKING-SAFE DEPOSIT BOXES-BANIK A Bax.y--Defendant
a country bank, advertised safe deposit boxes for rent. The plaintiff rented a
box, depositing securities therein. According to its custom the bank gave plain-
tiff one key and retained the master key itself, both keys being necessary to open
the box. The plaintiff's box was burglarized. The lower court held that the
bank was a bailee for hire and had exercised such care as was customary with
country banks in like circumstances, giving judgment for the defendant. Held,
that the judgment be affirmed. Young v. First National Bank of Oneida (1924,
Tenn.) 265 S. W. 681.
Many courts declare that a safe deposit company is a bailee for hire. Mayer
v. Brensinger (1899) ISO Ill. 110, 54 N. E. i59; Cussen v. So. California Bank
(190) 133 Calif. 534, 65 Pac. 1099; see Roberts v. Stuyvesant Safe Deposit Co.
(i8go) 123 N. Y. 57, 6I, 25 N. E. 294, 295; Cummins, Review of Law of Safe
Deposit Companies (I895) 9 HARv. L. Rxv. 131; Magee, Treatise on Law of
National and State Banks (2d ed. 1913) 459. Thus it is generally held to have
such possession of the contents as to be subject to garnishment in an action
against the depositor. Trowbridge v. Spinning (i9oo) 23 Wash. 48, 62 Pac.
125; Washington Loan and Trust Co. v. Susquehanna Coal Co. (I9O5) 26 App.
D. C. 149; West Cache Sugar Co. v. Hendrickson (1920) 56 Utah, 327, I9o Pac.
946; cf. United States v. Graff (1875, N. Y.) 67 Barb. 304; Tillinghast v.
JohnSon (1912) 34 R- I. 136, 82 AtI. 788; Paton, Digest of Legal Opinions
(1921) 78; contra: Gregg v. Hilson. (187o, Pa.) 8 Phila. 91; Cummins, op. cit.
at p. 137. So the bank has been held a ballee, subject to the provisions of the
Inheritance Tax Law. National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead (1911) 250 Ill. 584,
95 N. E. 973. Statutes frequently provide a warehouseman's lien for such
companies over the contents of unpaid-for boxes. Mo. Rev. Sts. 1909, sec. 1128;
N. Y. Cons. Laws, 1923, ch. 3, sec. 331 (providing for the sale of contents after
a certain period). Where the box contents are lost or stolen, courts generally
attach a bailee's responsibility to the safe deposit company. Safe Deposit Co.
of Pittsburgh v. Pollock (877) 85 Pa. 391; Koczora v. Standard Safe Deposit
Co. (1921) 221 Ill. App. 43; Webber v. Bank of California (1924, Calif.) 225 Pac.
41. Most text writers recognize that some of the factual elements of a normal
bailment are lacking and deny that the relation is a bailment, the bank not
having possession of the box contents which are generally unknown to it, and
the depositor alone having access to the box. Hale, Bailinents and Carriers
(1896) 249; Van Zile, Bailments and Carriers (2d ed. 1908) sec. i95; Dobie,
Handbook. on the Law of Bailnents and Carriers (1914) 167; 2 Street, Founda-
tions of Legal Liability (1906) 29i. Some of the adherents of this view con-
sider the relation as that of landlord and tenant. See People v. Mercantile
Safe Deposit Co. (1913, ist Dept.) 159 App. Div. 98, io1, 143 N. Y. Supp. 849,
85I; Van Zile, op. cit. sec. 196; NoTES and COMMENT (1925) 10 CORN. L. QUART.
255. But the few favoring cases lend scanty support to such a view. The
depositor has been declared to have possession of the box contents. See Mer-
cantile Safe Deposit Co. v. Huntington (1895) 89 Hun, 465, 469, 35 N. Y. Supp.
390, 392. And the bank has been held not to have possession or control of the
box contents within the provisions of a statute regulating the disposition of the
assets of a decedent. People v. Mercantile Safe Deposit Co. supra (bank kept
no key). Where one of two joint lessees of a safe deposit box acquired a
renewal to himself exclusively, he was compelled to hold it as if a co-tenant
for the benefit of the other lessee. Hackett v. Patterson (i89i, C. P.) 16 N. Y.
Supp. I7O. "Bailment" is a mere label of convenience attached to analogous
situations in which the courts recognize certain uniform legal relations. The
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lease of a safe deposit box may actually embody factual elements not present
in other situations whih the courts have called bailments. But where the
relation is sufficiently similar to give rise to the same legal relations, over-
emphasis of the technical inaccuracy of terminology seems hardly justifiable.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES-FICTITIOUS NAME. IN PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE CON-
STRUCTIVE NOTICE To SUBSEQUENT MoRTAa.Em-The purchaser of a pair of mules
executed a chattel mortgage under a fictitious name to secure the purchase price.
The mortgage was recorded. Subsequently he executed a mortgage to the plaintiff
in his recognized name on the same mules to secure a loan. The plaintiff had no
actual knowledge of the prior mortgage. In an action to foreclose the subsequent
mortgage, the prior mortgagee was joined as defendant. The lower court held
that the prior mortgagee prevailed. Held, that the judgment be affirmed. Farmer's
State Bank v. No. Oklahoma State Bank (1924, Okla.) 232 Pac. 916.
Some courts require a literal compliance with the recording statutes to make a
chattel mortgage constructive notice to third parties. Kennedy v. Shaw (872)
38 Ind. 474 (filing after lapse of statutory period) ; People v. Burns (i9io) i61
Mich. i69, 125 N. W. 74o (notary's jurat not signed); Bell v. Sage (1922) 6o
Calif. App. 149, 212 Pac. 404 (lack of acknowledgment by mortgagor); East
Texas Motor Co. v. Baughman (1923, Tex. Civ. App.) 248 S. W. 8o2 (improper
attestation of witnesses). It is better for the court to determine whether or
not the recordation was notice to the second mortgagee. Cf. Gillespie v. Brown
(1884) 16 Neb. 457, 2o N. W. 632 (mortgage provided for five days' notice after
default instead of statutory fifteen days); Davis v. Caldwell (1917) 37 N. D. x,
163 N. W. 275 (name of witness placed in body of mortgage); First Nat. Bank v.
Cargill Elevator Co. (1923) 155 Minn. 30, 192 N. W. III (omission of date
commission of notary expired). But everywhere recordation in the wrong county
is not constructive notice. Payne v. King (igio) 141 Mo. App. 246, x24 S. W.
io66; Peaks v. Smith (i9o8) io4 Me. 315, 71 Atl. 884; McLarty v. Ashmore
(1922) 128 Miss. 735, 9i So. 421. Similarly, where the mortgagor's name is
fictitious. Mackey v. Cole (i8gi) 79 Wis. 427, 48 N. W. 520; Fish Furniture Co.
v. Reliable Storage Co. (1914) 187 Ill. App. 6 (purchase money mortgage) ; see
Ingram v. Watson (1924, Ala.) 100 So. 557, 56o; contra: Alexander v. Graves
(i889) 25 Neb. 453, 41 N. W. z9o. Or even where there was a mistake in an
initial in the name of the mortgagor. First Nat. Bank v. Haconda Mercantile Co.
(igio) i69 Ala. 476, 53 So. 802; McReynolds v. First National Bank (1922)
156 Ark. 291, 245 S. W. 81g; contra: First National Bank v. Farmer's Bank
(1922) 2o7 Ala. 402, 92 So. 639. The court in the instant case relied on a state-
ment in Jones, Chattel Mortgages (i9o8, 5th ed.) sec. 247a, distinguishing purchase
money from other mortgages. The same statement has led at least one other
court into the same curious distinction. Windle v. Citizens Nat. Bank (igig) 204
Mo. App. 6o6, 216 S. W. io2o. The distinction seems inconsistent with the gen-
eral rule that the vendee of goods under a fictitious name has the power to confer
good title on an innnocent purchaser for value. Williston, Sales (2d ed. i924) sec.
635. Nor is it in accord with the policy of our recording statutes which is to
protect purchasers without notice. It seems also unsound from the standpoint of
prevailing commercial notions to make such an arbitrary distinction.
COrTEr-PT-S-I'oENAING UNNECESSA IY WIrNEssEs.-The petitioner, charged
with commission of certain felonies, subpoenaed one hundred and sixty-seven
witnesses. Many of these he claimed were character witnesses, although evidence
showed that some of these had no material or relevant testimony. He could give
no reason whatsoever for having subpoenaed others. The lower court held this to
be contempt. Held, that the judgment be reversed. Ex parte Stroud (1925, Ark.)
268 S. W. 13.
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Courts have power in general to punish as contempt any act directly tending to
"obstruct the course of justice." Beale, Contempt of Court (198o) 21 HMv. L.
REV. 161. Such a power is essential to expedite process and preserve order in
judicial proceedings. In re Ulmer (1913, C. C. E. D. Ohio) 2o8 Fed. 461;
McDougal v. Sheridan (1913) 23 Idaho, 191, 128 Pac. 954. But the modern
tendency is to ameliorate summary process and restrict the extension of the doc-
trine of contempt. Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure
in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior Federal Courts" (1924) 37 HAgv. L. Rxv.
ioio; Junius Hart Piano House v. Ingman (1907) 119 La. 1017, 44 So. 850.
Even though at times the danger of harshness on the part of a judge is a lesser
evil than suppression of the judicial function by unrestrained disorder. Beale,
loc. cit. But the court may limit the number of witnesses. 4 Wigmore, Evidence
(2d ed. 1923) sec. 19o8; Samuels v. United States (1916, C. C. A. 8th) 232 Fed.
536; White v. Boston (1904) 186 Mass. 65, 71 N. E. 75 (expert witnesses);
Hague v. United States (1921, C. C. A. 9th) 276 Fed. 1Ii; Kendrix v. State
(1919) 138 Ark. 594, 212 S. W. 84 (character witnesses). In the instant case,
therefore, there was'actually no danger of "obstructing the course of justice."
COPORATioNS-AGENcy-RESPONSImiLITY OF MASTER FOR AGENT'S SLANDER.-
The assistant manager of the defendant corporation's hotel, having authority 
to
investigate improper conduct in hotel rooms, ejected the plaintiff Martin, a barber,
and the plaintiff O'Brien, a manicurist, from a guest's room to which they had 
been
summoned, and while so doing applied slanderous epithets to them. Judgments 
in
separate actions in slander were entered on the verdicts for the plaintiffs. Held,
that the judgments be reversed and the complaints dismissed. O'Brien v. B. L. M.
Bates Corporation, Martin v. Same .(1925, App. Div. ist Dept.) 2o8 N. 
Y.
Supp. 110.
Some courts, while recognizing the master's responsibility for the 
slander of his
agent, have refused to impose vicarious responsibility to the 
same extremes in
slander as in assault. In these courts an unauthorized assault is 
often considered
within the scope of employment. St. Peter v. Telephone Co. (1911) 151 Iowa,
294, 131 N. W. 2 (assault by a. telephone operator upon a customer); Seymour 
v.
Greenwood (861, Exch.) 7 H. & N. 354 (unwonted violence in expelling 
an
omnibus passenger) ; Geralty v. Stern (1883, N. Y.) 30 Hun, 426 (assault on a
store customer mistakenly thought a rival company's spy). But under apparently
similar circumstances a slander is outside the scope. Vowles v. Yokish (1920)
191 Iowa, 368, 179 N. W. 117 (slander by insurance adjuster settling a claim);
Glasgow Corporation v. Lorimer [1911, H. L.] A. C. 209 (accusation of 
forgery
while officially investigating an account). Other courts have refused to make 
this
differentiation. Roemer v. Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co. (1916) 132 Minn. 399,
-157 N. W. 64o (accountant's accusation of thievery to 
ex-employe demanding
back pay); Citizens Gas & Electric Co. v. Black (i916) 95 Ohio St. 
42, iiS
N. E. 495 (meter inspector's accusation of theft of gas) ; see Palmeri 
v. Man-
hattan Ry. (1892) 133 N. Y. 261, 30 N. E. ioox. The decision in the 
instant case
illustrates a present-day tendency, made possible by the 
flexibility of the test
"scope of employment , toward restriction in this phase of the doctrine of
respondeat superior. Admitting that an obvious pecuniary 
loss is less likely to
result from slander than from physical injury, query whether economic 
policy
should not favor a distributed loss, and the burden be placed 
on the corporation.
EI.EcrIoNs-DEATH OF CANDIDATE RECEIVING HIGHEST VoTE-EFFECT 
OF NOTICE
TO ELECTORS.-Ward, Canty and the petitioner were candidates 
for public office
for which two were to be chosen. The morning before election, 
Canty died, which
fact was given wide publicity in the newspapers and 
was imparted to the voters
individually at the polls by the petitioner's supporters. In 
spite of this knowledge,
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the balloting resulted in 5317 votes for Ward, 942 for Canty and 1165 for the
petitioner. The defendant, Board of Election Commissioners, refused to certify
the petitioner's election. The petitioner asks for a writ of mandamus to compel
the defendants to certify his election. Held, that the writ issue. Madden v.
Board of Election Coin'rs of City of Boston (1925, Mass.) i46 N. E. 28o.
Qualified electors who fail to vote are bound by the controlling number of those
who do. Southington v. Southington Water Co. (19o8) 8o Conn. 646, 69 Atl.
1023; 13 Ann. Cas. 4zo, note. Blank, unintelligible or illegal ballots are disre-
garded in determining the results so that a majority of the residue will carry the
proposition. Hopkins v. City of Duluth (igoo) 81 Minn. i89, 83 N. W. 536;
contra: Lawrence v. Ingersoll (i889) 88 Tenn. 52, 12 S. W. 422. But votes cast
for a candidate in ignorance of his ineligibility, legal or factual, though not
electing him, are effective to prevent the election of the next highest candidate and
to necessitate a new election. The King v. Bridge (1813, K. B.) I M. & S. 76;
Heald v. Payson (913) 1IO Me. 204, 85 AtL 576. If, however, the facts making
the candidate ineligible are known, the' English rule is that the votes are to be
regarded as nullities on the theory that one is "presumed to know the law." Beres-
ford-Hope v. Lady Sandhurst (I889) L. R. 23 Q. B. Div. '79; Gulick v. New
(I86O) 14 Ind. 93. In the United States, a knowledge of the facts and of the rule of law
making the candidate ineligible is required to show an intention wilfully to throw
away one's vote. People v. Clute (1872) 5o N. Y. 451. So, where the death of
a candidate is known, it has been held that the voters intended to throw away
their votes. State v. Frear (19io) 144 Wis. 79, 128 N. W. io68. A possibility
that the candidate may be declared eligible is sufficient to show "good faith" so as
not to elect the next highest State v. Cameron (1923) 179 Wis. 405, 192 N. W.
374. And it has even been held that "bad faith" is immaterial so long as the
candidate himself is not involved in the "fraud." See Gardner v. Burke (1901)
61 Neb. 534, 85 N. W. 541. Contrary to these views, there seems to be a growing
tendency to regard votes for an ineligible candidate as "protest votes." State v.
Walsh (879) 7 Mo. App. 142 (death of candidate receiviog highest number of
votes known; new election necessary) ; Woll v. Jensen (1917) 36 N. D. 250, 162
N. W. 403; see Sanders v. Rice (I918) 41 R. I. 127, io. Atl. 914. But, in the
instant case, even in the absence of evidence of protest against the minority candi-
date, the fact that the supporters of the latter gave notice to the voters of the
ineligible candidate's disqualification should not raise a presumption that the votes
were cast "in wilful defiance of the law." Sanders v. Rice, supra. A plausible
inference is that the votes were so cast out of respect for the memory of the
deceased candidate, thus necessitating a new election.
GARm S ENT-IsSun oF WAEHousE RECmPTS oN GARNISHED GooDs.-
Plaintiff got a writ of garnishment against a defaulting seller. The sheriff,
finding in defendant's warehouses 2oo bales of linters of the seller who held
negotiable warehouse receipts therefor, garnished these bales and left a copy
of the writ. Defendant had also 123 more bales of the seller's left by a railroad
with bills of lading still outstanding. These bills being subsequently received,
the railroad released the 123 bales to defendant who delivered negotiable ware-
house receipts therefor to the seller. The lower court quashed the attachment
as to all 323 bales and plaintiff appealed. Held, that the judgment be affirmed
as to the 2oo bales and reversed as to the 123 bales. Jnernational Bedding Co.
v. Terminal Warehouse Co. (1924, Md.) 126 Atl. 9o2.
Before the uniform state laws one could garnish goods with negotiable ware-
house receipts outstanding, the garnishee being responsible if he delivered the
goods even to a subsequent purchaser of the receipts for value. Smith v. Picket(1849) 7 Ga. io4; but cf. Roudebush v. Hollis (1898) 21 Pa. Co. Ct. 324. Under
these acts to garnish goods for which a negotiable document of title is out-
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standing one must first impound the document or enjoin 'its negotiation. Sales
Act, sec. 39; Bills of Lading Act, sec. 24; Warehouse Receipts Act, sec. 25; 2
Williston, Sales (2d ed. 1924)"sec. 438, 439. And if the garnishee delivers the
goods to the garnishor with document outstanding he is responsible to an inno-
cent purchaser. Love v. Compress Co. (1924, Miss.) ioz So. 275. That the
acts do not apply to replevin, see (1924) 24 Cor. L. REv. 931. Accordingly in
the instant case ihere was no valid garnishment of the 2oo bales. There has
been some confusion as to the proceedings necessary to effective garnishment.
Apparently attachment of the document itself is ineffective. Pottash v. Oil Co.
(I922) 274 Pa. 384, II8 At. 317; NoTrs and COMMENT (1923) 8 CORN. L.
QUART. 176. And no effective injunction can issue in a state having jurisdic-
tion over neither the document nor the holder. Brimberg v. Bag Co. (i9x8)
89 N. J. Eq. 425, io5 At. 68. But the instant case is peculiar as to the 123
bales. In most states a garnishee is responsible only as to the goods of the
principal debtor in his hands at the time of garnishment. Falk v. Exp. Co.
(i92) 79 Pa. Super. Ct. 99; Drake, Attachment (7th ed. i8gi) sec. 45ia, 667.
But in Maryland he is responsible also as to goods subsequently coming into his
possession. Ann. Code, i9II, art. 9, sec. io; Farley v. Colver (igio) 113 Md.
379, 77 Atl. 589. It was therefore held that the writ left with defendant acted
upon the 123 bales as soon as the railroad released them to the garnishee. A
garnishee who delivers the res to the principal debtor or to a third party is
personally responsible to the garnishor. Alexander v. Trust Co. (ig2I) 2o6
Ala. 5o, 89 So. 66; (I909) 7 MICH. L. REV. 42. Plaintiff therefore properly
recovered in the instant case. *A garnishor may sue for conversion one who gets
the res with notice. Focke v. Blum (i8gi) 82 Tex. 436, 17 S. W. 77o. But not an
innocent purchaser. MeGarry v. Coal Co. (1887) 93 Mo. 237, 6 S. W. 8i. He
may enjoin surrender of the res by the garnishee only if the latter is insolvent.
Sweet v. Oliver (I88I) 56 Iowa, 744, io N. W. 275; contra: Bigelow v. Andress
(1863) 31 Ill. 322 (not even then). It has been said that the garnishor has a
specific lien. Allen v. Hall (i842) 46 Mass. 263; Rood, Has the Garnishing
Creditor a Specific Lien? (i9oo) 51 CmrN. L. JouR. 25. An equitable lien.
Reed v. Fletcher (i888) 24 Neb. 435, 39 N. W. 47. An inchoate lien., Dish-
,nan v. Griffis (1917) i98 Ala. 664, 73 So. 966. Only a personal right against
the garnishee. Sargent v. State (1921) 47 N. D. 561, 182 N. W. 27o; Drake,
op. cit. sec. 453. The instant case suggests the problem, what on the same facts
would have been the garnishor's remedy if the garnishee had become insolvent.
In specific lien jurisdictions it would seem that the garnishee had no goods of
the principal debtor for which he could issue a valid document of title. The
receipts would therefore be absolutely void and the rights of even an innocent
purchaser would be subject to the lien. Cf. Soltau v. Gerdau (18go) iig N. Y.
380, 23 N. E. 864 (warehouse receipts issued to a thief). Where the garnishor
is held to have a mere personal right, the contrary is of course true. The
former seems the view likely to be taken under the uniform state laws.
Impounding of outstanding documents of title would be ineffective if a gar-
nishee by issuing similar documents could convey title to an innocent purchaser.
INSURANcE-DEwvATION BY VESSEL-WHEN ExcusED.-During the late war, a
vessel insured for a voyage "at and from New York to Gothenberg, and return,"
was intercepted by a British warship on the return trip, taken to an English port
for search, and held there a number of months. As a result the vessel's supply
of coal was almost exhausted, but although the search had revealed no contra-
band, sufficient coal to complete the voyage was refused unless the vessel would
first proceed to Sweden for a cargo. While returning from Sweden to England
with the cargo, the vessel was torpedoed. The trial court decided that this was
not such an unnecessary deviation as would relieve the insurers from responsi-
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bility. Held, that the decision be affirmed. Aktiebolaget Malareprovinsernas
Bank v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. (1925, Sup. Ct) 2o8 N. Y. Supp. 173.
Any "voluntary" departure from' the contract of insurance by the assured, even
though the risk be lessened thereby and the ship regain her route before any loss
occurs, is a deviation discharging the underwriters. King v. Delaware Insurance
Co. (18og, U. S.) 6 Cranch, 71; Kettel v. Wiggin. (1816) 13 Mass. 68; (i9o6) 6
Edw. Z c. 41, sec. 46. Any delay in port for the prosecution 6f other business,
or any unreasonable delay in prosecuting the business of the voyage is a deviation.
African Merchants v. British Insurance Co. (1873) L. R. 8 Exch. 154. Or, a
departure to avoid a peril not insured against. O'Reilly v. Royal Exchange
Assurance Co. (1815, N. P.) 4 Campb. 246. A departure is excused where
mutiny of the crew, peril of the sea, danger of capture, want of repairs, disability
of the crew, or unseaworthiness of the vessel permits the master no alternative
and he is forced to leave his route. See Burgess v. Equitable Marine Insurance
Co. (1878) 126 Mass. 70. Stoppage to save human life is excused, but not to
save property. See The Henry Ewbank (1833, C. C. D. Mass.) i Sumn. 4oo.
The discharge of the insurer depends not upon increase of risk, but wholly on
departure of the insured from the contract of insurance. Maryland Insurance Co.
v. LeRoy (1812, U. S.) 7 Cranch, 28. The reason for the construction of marine
insurance policies in favor of the insurer seems historical, for before modern
methods of communication the insurer was almost completely dependent on the
insured for information. As a result decisions are often harsh, but the instant
case seems within the rule excusing departures compelled by some external force
beyond the master's control.
INSURANCE-EXCEPTFD RISKS-IEQUMEMENT OF CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN
RISK AND AccmuT.-The plaintiff was insured against accidents to his automobile
under a policy excepting the defendant company from responsibility "while" the
automobile was "being driven by any person in violation of the law as to age, or
if there be no age limit, under the age of sixteen years." In Mississippi there is
no such age limit. The plaintiff's car met with an accident while being driven by
a boy under sixteen. There was, however, no direct causal connection between
the fact of the car being so driven and the accident. The lower court found for
the plaintiff and the defendant appealed. Held, that the judgment be reversed.
Hossley v. Union Indemnity Co. of New York (1925, Miss.) 1o2 So. 561.
A clause in an insurance policy excepting responsibility while a certain state
of facts continues has been construed to require a causal relation between the
excepted risk and the loss. Thus when injury received in voluntary exposure to
danger is excepted, there must be a causal connection between the exposure and the
injury. ,Etna Life Insurance Co. v. Hicks (igoo) 23 Tex. Civ. App. 74, 56 S. W.
87. Similarly, when the exception is of injuries received in violation of law, "in
violation" is construed as meaning "in consequence of violation." Jones v. United
States Mutual Accident Association (1894) 92 Iowa, 652, 6r N. W. 485; see
Bloom v. Franklin Life Insurance Co. (1884) 97 Ind. 478; Vance, Insurance
(904) 526. But when the exception is intoxication, there need be no causal con-
nection. Shader V. Railway Passengers' Assurance Co. (1875, N. Y. Sup. Ct. 4th
Dept.) 3 Hun, 424, affd. (1876) 66 N. Y. 441; Standard Life & Accident Insur-
ance Co. v. Jones (1892) 94 Ala. 434, 10 So. 53o; see Mabee v. Continental Cas-
ualty. Co. (i923) 37 Idaho, 667, 219 Pac. 598; Vance, op. cit. 585. So in case the
exception is of injuries received in violation of a child labor law. Goodwillie v.
London Guarantee & Accident Co. (i9oo) 1o8 Wis. 2'7, 84 N. W. 164 (a child
employed under statutory age) ; Tozer v. Ocean & Accident & Guarantee Corp.
(19o5) 94 Minn. 478, 1o3 N. W. 5o9; cf. Kilby Car & Foundry Co. v. Georgia
Casualty Co. (1923) 209 Ala. 356, 96 So. 319. Similarly, when the exception, as
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in the instant case, is of injuries received while a passenger conveyance is operated
by a boy under the statutory age, or, in absence of statute, pnder eighteen.
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of Nero York v. Palmer Hotel Co. (Igi8) 179 Ky. 518,
2o0 S. W. 923 (accident in elevator due to faulty construction). Where the
excepted mode of conduct is of a general nature, a variety of circumstances may
fall within the literal provisions of the policy. Here it seems more within the
contemplation of the parties to limit the exception to cases where there is a causal
connection. But the mode of conduct excepted in the instant case is of a particular
nature. The construction of the clause should therefore be to suspend the opera-
tion of the policy during periods of time in which the automobile is being driven
by a person under sixteen, and causation seems irrelevant to the issue.
INTERNATioNAL LAW-ExTRADioN-CoNwcTioN FOR OFFmNSE NOT Covm
By TRATY.-The relator was extradited from England on a charge of grand
larceny and a violation of the Penal Code. Only the former was an extradita-
ble crime under the treaty. He was acquitted of the larceny charge, but con-
victed for violation of the Penal Code. He sued out a writ of habeas corpus.
Held, that the writ be dismissed. People ex rel. Stilwell v. Hanley (i924,
Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 2o7 N. Y. Supp. 176.
Under the territorial theory of crime, a fugitive criminal will ordinarily
escape punishment unless he is brought back to the country where the crime was
committed. 4 Moore, Digest of International Law (1o6) 287. The court will
not inquire into the method used to effect his return, since the social necessity
of punishment is deemed to outweigh the undesirability of force or fraud. Ker
v. Illinois (1886) 119 U. S. 436, 7 Sup. Ct. 225; United States v'. Unverzagt(I924, W. D. Wash.) 299 Fed. ioi5; contra: In re Robinson (i8go) 29 Neb.
135, 45 N. W. 267; cf. Bell v. Lawrence (1913, City Ct. Spec. T.) 14o N. Y.
Supp. 1Io6 (service of civil process by trick set aside). There is no duty
imposed by international law to surrender fugitives on demand, and municipal
law or policy may forbid a surrender in the absence of treaty. Act of Aug. I2,
1848, sec. 5 (9 Stat. at L. 303) ; cf. Ex parte McCabe (i89i, W. D. Tex.) 46
Fed. 363; Tucker v. Alexandroff (I9o2) 183 U. S. 424, 22 Sup. Ct. i95. There-
fore when a demand is made under a treaty, the surrendering country must be
assured that the treaty is not being used as a cloak under which to punish for an
unextraditable offense. cf. Smith v. Canal Zone (1918, C. C. A. 5th) 249 Fed.
273; (1922) 35 HAv. L. REv. 618. And the punishment must be limited to the
crime for which the fugitive was extradited. United States v. Rauscher (1886)
119 U. S. 407, 7 Sup. Ct. 234; Johnson v. Browne (1907) 205 U. S. 309, 27 Sup.
Ct. 539; Treaty of i889, art. 3 (26 Stat. at L Io9) "No person . . . . shall
be .... tried for any crime .... other than the offense for which he was surren-
dered .... ;"; (i87o) 33 and 34 Vict. ch. 52, sec. ig; see (1922) 31 YAIL LAw
JouPNAL, 443; Cf. Collins V. O'Neil (I909) 214 U. S. 113, 29 Sup. Ct. 573
(punishable for a crime committed after extradition). Compare interstate
rendition where there is a duty to surrender (U. S. Const. Art. 4, sec. 2) and
hence no such limitation. Lascelles v. Georgia (1893) 148 U. S. 537, 13 Sup.
Ct. 687; (1922) 6 MixN. L. REv. 595. And the accused may oppose a violation
thereof. 4 Moore, op. cit. 321; see NOTE AND COMMENT (1922) 20 MIcH. L.
Rav. 536. When the demand for extradition includes an unextraditable
offense, it has been assumed that the demanding country will not
allow a trial for any but the extraditable offense. Kelly v. Griffin (1915)
241 U. S. 6, 36 Sup. Ct. 487 (extradition from U. S.); Bingham v. Bradley
(i915) 241 U. S. 511, 36 Sup. Ct. 634 (same). Or that the surrendering country
voluntarily assented to the demand irrespective of treaty. Ex parte Foss (894)
1O2 Calif. 347, 36 Pac. 669 (extradition into U. S.) ; see Greene v. United States(19o7, C. C. A. 5th) 154 Fed. 4oi (same). The accused cannot oppose punish-
YALE LAW JOURNAL
ment unless the first assumption is made. The instant case makes the second
assumption and thereby reads a modification into the treaty when we are the
demanding country, which we would have to protest were we the surrendering
country. See Act of Aug. 12, 1848, supra.
REAL. PROPERTY-EASEMFNTS-PRESCRIPTION AGAINST MUNICPALITY.-In 1870
the plaintiff's predecessor in title built a stairway from the street to his basement
floor, encroaching upon the sidewalk. This had been continuously used until the
defendant city ordered its removal. The plaintiff sued to restrain enforcement of
this order. From an adverse decree the plaintiff appealed. Held, that the decree
be reversed. Engleman v. City of Kalamazoo (I925, Mich.) 2oi N. W. 88o.
Interests in land belonging to the federal or state government cannot be acquired
by adverse possession or user. Oaksiniths' Lessees v. Johnston (1875) 92 U. S.
343; Hemphill v. Moy (917) 31 Idaho, 66, I69 Pac. 288; Perry v. Barnes
(189i) I Ch. 658 (prescription). The rule rests on the theory that the rights of
the people should not be prejudiced by the negligence of public officials who have
not the incentive of private owners to guard these rights. United States v. Hoar
(1821, C. C. Mass.) 2 Mason, 311. Some courts have held that this rule should
not be applied to a municipality since it is a more compact body and encroachments
upon its rights are more likely to be noticed. Ft. Smith v. McKibbin (1883) 41
Ark. 45; Meyer v. Lincoln (I8gi) 33 Neb. 566, 5o N. W. 763. But the increasing
weight of authority applies the same rule to municipalities. Donovan v. Union
Pac. Ry. (i92o) io3 Neb. 663, 177 N. W. i59; Board of Com'rs of Douglas
County v. City of Lawrence (1918) IO2 Kan. 656, 171 Pac. 6Io; Foote v. Town
of Watonga (I913) 37 Okla. 43, 130 Pac. 597. Prior to i9o7 the minority rule
had been firmly established in Michigan. Flynn v. City of Detroit (1892) 93
Mich. 590, 53 N. W. 815; Vier v. City of Detroit (1897) iii Mich. 646, 7o N. W.
i39; Schneider v. City of Detroit (i9o4) 135 Mich. 570, 98 N. W. 258. But in
i9o7 Michigan was brought into line with the majority rule by statute. Mich.
Pub. Acts, i9o7, no. 64. In the instant case the easement had already been per-
fected in i9o7 by 37 years of adverse user. The statute therefore did not apply.
SALEs-FAI IuUE To NoTIFY SELLER OF BREACH OF WARRANTY WITHIN A
REASONABIE Tmis-After completion of a contract for the sale of cotton pickings
warranted equal to sample, the buyer's agent inspected and approved the bales and
the buyer paid and resold. Five months later the final purchaser rejected them
because of false packing which a proper inspection at any time would have
revealed. On the ground that the seller's warranty survived both inspection and
acceptance, the trial court awarded the buyer damages and the seller appealed.
Held, that the judgment be reversed. American Waste Co., Inc. v. St. Mary
(1924, ist Dept.) 21o App. Div. 383, 2o6 N. Y. Supp. 316.
It is questionable whether inspection by the buyer waives an express warranty.
Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Union Gin & Lumber Co. (917) 138 Tenn. s8, 195 S.
W. 77o; I Williston, Sales (2d ed. 1924) 4o2. Especially where the inspection
occurs after the contracting. Hitz v. Warner (IgI) 47 Ind. App. 612, 93 N. E.
ioo5. But the decision may be supported on the basis that the buyers' failure to
give notice within a reasonable time after he ought to have known of the breach
of warranty relieves the seller of responsibility therefor. Uniform Sales Act, sec.
49. No mention was made of the Sales Act in the instant case.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-SUIT BY VENDEE WHO HAS SOLD TO A THIRD
PAirrY.-'The plaintiff agreed to build a party wall in consideration for the defen-
dant's promise to convey to him a five-foot strip of land. The plaintiff built the
wall, but the defendant did not convey the strip. The plaintiff sold the strip
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with covenants of warranty, and then sued for specific performance. The defen-
dant demurred on the ground that the subvendee was the only one who could
bring the suit or was at least a necessary party. The demurrer was overruled.
Held, that the ruling be affirmed. Blair v. Morris (1924, Ala.) 1oI So. 745.
When the vendee in an executory contract for the sale of land contracts to
resell, he retains his interest in the original contract, and further assumes a duty
to deliver good title to the subvendee. Bittrick v. Consolidated Improvement Co.
(199o) 51 Wash. 469, 99 Pac. 303; see Mier Co. v. Hadden (19o7) 148 Mich. 488,
III N. W. io4co; Noras (1921) 21 COL. L. REv. 8o. cf. Hazelton v. Miller
(19o5) 25 App. D. C. 337; Schmid v. Whitten (1920) 114 S. C. 245, lO3 S. E.
553 (remedy at law deemed adequate). But when he attempts to resell and
convey the land, he thereby effects an assignment of all his interest and therefore
cannot bring an action to enforce the original contract of sale. Brewer v. Dodge
(1873) 28 Mich. 359; cf. Taylor v. Hurst (1919) 186 Ky. 7r, 216 S-. W. 95.
However, when the attempted sale is with covenants of warranty, the vendee's
obligations under the warranty deed would seem to make him an interested party,
as in the contract of sale. Cf. Manning v. Marchinan (192o) 15o Ga. 309, 103
S. E. 795. And since by the doctrine of equitable estoppel, title acquired by the
vendee will be immediately transferred to the subvendee, it seems sound not to
require the subvendee to be joined as a necessary party to the action.
TAxATIoN-VALInlTY OF SuccEsSIoN TAX ON FoRa1GN LAND EQUITABLY CON-
vERTED.-Testatrix, domiciled in South Carolina, directed in her will that her real
estate in Pennsylvania be sold to carry out certain legacies. The South Carolina
Tax Commission included the value of that real estate in assessing the transfer
tax, on the theory that the absolute direction in the will effected such a conversion
of the real estate into personalty as to permit the state of the domicile to tax its
transfer. From this ruling, the executors and legatee appealed. Held, that the
ruling be affirmed. Land Title & Trust Co. v. South Carolina Tax Commission
(1925, S. C.) 126 S. E. i8g.
The state of the domicile of a decedent has jurisdiction to impose a tax on the
succession to rights relating to movables wherever they are situated. Frothingham
v. Shaw (1899) 175 Mass. 59, 55 N. E. 623; State ex rel. Smith v. Probate Court
of Ransey County (1914) 124 Minn. 508, 145 N. W. 390. The succession to rights
relating to immovables may be validly taxed only by the state of their physical
location. In. re Swift (1893) 137 N. Y. 77, 32 N. E. io96; Allen v. National
State Bank (igoi) 92 Md. 509, 48 At. 78. In the instant case the law of thd
physical location of the immovables recognizes the doctrine of "equitable conver-
sion" by direction in the will to sell the land, and declares the rights in the immov-
ables to be "personal property." In re Dulls Estate (19o8) 222 Pa. 208, 71 Atl. 9.
This may be construed as sufficient acquiescence by the state of the physical loca-
tion of the land to justify the state of the domicile in taxing the succession to
these rights as to other personal property. (1915) 29 HAv. L. REv. 343; (1920)
5 IowA L. BuL. 278. Pennsylvania and Iowa alone apply the doctrine of "equit-
able conversion" by the law of the domicile in construing the will, without regard
to the law of the physical location of the land. Then having said the rights are
"personal property," they tax the succession to them as such. Dalrymple's Estate
(1906) 215 Pa. 367, 64 Atl. 554; In re Sanford's Estate (1919) 188 Iowa, 833,
175 N. W. 506; Ross, Inheritance Taxation (1912) sec. 55. This seems support-
able on no theory. Jurisdiction to impose a succession tax is based on the service
of the state in transferring the rights, and the state of the physical location of
immovables does this. Clarke v. Clarke (igoo) 178 U. S. 186, 20 Sup. Ct. 873;
Connell v. Crosby (1904) 210 Ill. 380, 71 N. E. 350; McCurdy v. McCurdy (19o8)
197 Mass. 248, 83 N. E. 881; (192o) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 808.
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TRUSTS-CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTs-CoNFIENTAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
BANKER AND CUSTOMER-PURCHASE OF PROPERTY BY BANKER FOR WHICH Cus-
ToMER WAS NEGOTIATING.-The plaintiff, a customer of the defendant's bank, and
the defendant were negotiating for the purchase of the same property, unknown
to each other. In asking the defendant for a loan, the plaintiff declared that it
had bought the property. The defendant, discovering that the property had not
been sold, put in a still higher offer than its previous one and got it. The plain-
tiff seeks to impress a constructive trust upon the property acquired by the defend-
-ant. Held, that judgment be for the defendant. Stewart & Co. v. Marcus and
Others (1924, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 124 Misc. 86, 2o7 N. Y. Supp. 685.
A fiduciary who acquires property in violation of his duty will be regarded, as a
constructive trustee. Rolikatis v. Lovett (1913) 213 Mass. 545, ioo N. E. 748
(attorney) ; Rogers v. Genung (1909) 76 N. J. Eq. 3o6, 74 Atl. 473 (broker);
Mitchell v. Reed (1874) 61 N. Y. 123 (partner); see (924) 33 YALE LAw
JOURNAL, 885. Or, if the property be resold, he will be responsible to the bene-
ficiary for an accounting. Wakeman v. Dodd (1876) 27 N. J. Eq. 564. Business
practice justifies the recognition of a confidential relationship between banker and
customer. Tournier v. Nat'l Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924, C. A.]
I K. B. 461; see CommENs (924) 33 YAix LAW JOURNAL, 859. In the instant
case, however, the untruth of the plaintiff's statement and the fact that the defend-
ant was at the time negotiating for the property clearly show that no confidence
was intended.
WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS-PERsONS QUALIFD TO ISSUE UNDER THE UNIORM
Acr.-The plaintiff, a chattel mortgagee of two automobiles to secure a debt of
the Conway Storage Co. and one Stary, its president, sued the defendant for
the conversion of the cars. The defendant set up that it had a superior lien
derived from warehouse receipts for the cars, issued by the storage company
as security for debts, the receipts having been issued before the mortgage was
executed and the cars subsequently delivered on surrender of the receipts.
Stary, operating a garage business, had formed the storage company and obtained
a license to operate a public storage business. But the company had no ware-
house other than the garage nor did it appear to receive any goods other than
those handled by Stary in his garage business. The plaintiff had, however,
previously held as security the company's warehouse receipts covering goods of
this kind. The trial court found that Stary was the owner in possession of the
cars when the mortgage was executed and rendered a judgment for the plaintiff
from which the defendant appealed. Held, (one judge dissenting) that the
judgment be reversed. Michigan City Bank v. First Bank of Manvel (1924,
N. D.) 2oi N. W. 176.
Recording statutes are good evidence that secret liens and pledges are gen-
erally looked upon with disfavor by legislators. See also sec. 55, Uniform
Warehouse Receipts Act. Free passage of property in goods without necessity
of their physical transfer tends to increase the volume of business which can
be transacted. Mohun, The Effect of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act
(1913) 13 CoL L. RE-v. 22, 212. But since free transfer of goods in storage
is not reconcilable with free transfer of documents representing them, the docu-
ments can be properly substituted only when there is adequate notice that the
possessor of the goods is a warehouseman. Accordingly, only one lawfully
engaged in the business of storing goods for profit is qualified to issue valid
warehouse receipts, probably on the theory that one so engaged will so advertise
and transact his business that the public will have a knowledge of its nature
sufficient to put it on guard against outstanding receipts. Uniform Act, supra,
secs. I, 58. Thus a mere casual bailee is not so qualified. Alton v. NVew York
Taxicab Co. (191o, Sup. Ct. App. T.) 66 Misc. 191, 121 N. Y. Supp. 271. Nor
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is one storing merely his own goods. Moore v. Thomas Moore Distilling Co.
(1915) 247 Pa. 312, 93 Atl. 347; Citizens' Bank v. Willing (i92o) lO9 Wash.
464, i86 Pac. IO72. But profit need not be derived from direct payment. Citi-
zens' Bank of Vici v. Gettig (919) 77 Okla. 48, 187 Pac. 217 (warehouseman
expected to purchase goods). Change in possession, and control of the goods
of course, is an important fact in these transactions. Moore v. Jagode (igoo)
195 Pa. 163, 45 Atl. 723; Love v. Export Storage Co. (i9o6, C. C. A. 6th) 143
Fed. I; Laube v. Seattle Nat. Bank (1924) 130 Wash. 55o, 228 Pac. 594- Setting
apart the goods and tagging them is evidence of such change. American Can
Co. v. Erie Preserving Co. (igio, C. C. A. 2d) 183 Fed. 96; Peoples Bank of
Buffalo v. The Aetna Indemnity Co. (igi6) 9I Conn. 57, 98 At. 353. So also
a warehousing sign on the building. Love v. Export Storage Co. supra; Union
Trust Co. v. Wilson (i9O5) i98 U. S. 530, 25 Sup. Ct. 766. But when there
is no such evidence of change in control that creditors and third parties may
receive notice therefrom, the transaction constitutes neither a sale, mortgage,
nor pledge, but is a mere contract to deliver. Nat'l. Bank of Kansas City v.
Flanagan Mills Co. (i9i6) 268 Mo. 547, i88 S. W. 117. And courts have shown
a tendency to look through a sham covering of such transactions to their real
nature. Security Warehousing Co. v. Hand (i9o7) 206 U. S. 415, 27 Sup.
Ct. 720; Citizens' Bank v. Willing, supra. The court, in the instant case,
divided as to the fact of notice. The decision and dissent both seem sound when
considered along with their findings on the facts.
WILLS-AOPTED CHILD NOT INCLUDED IN DEVs TO CHILDREN oF TESTATOR'S
SoN.-Testator left real estate to his son for life and at his death one-half inter-
est to his children, if any, or if he died childless to the appellant. The son died
childless unless the appellee, adopted 14 years after the testator's death, be con-
sidered a "child." The circuit court held that the appellee was a "child" of the
testator's son and entitled to the one-half interest. Held, that the judgment be
reversed. Caspar v. Helvie (1925, Ind.) 146 N. E. 123.
Where the intention to include adopted persons in a devise to "children" is not
clear, the time of adoption and the identity of the testator must be considered as
evidencing his intention. Munie v. Gruenewald (i919) 289 Ill. 468, 124 N. E.
6o5 (adoption before execution of will evidenced intention to include adopted
child); Sewall v. Roberts (1874) i15 Mass. 262 (adopted child held to have been
intended, adoptive parent being testator); see Pa. Sts. 1920, par. 8327; Kales,
Estates and Future Interests (i92o) 675. In some states the adoption statutes
are so limited as to give the person adopted the rights of an heir only and not of
a child by birth. Tex. Rev. Civ. Sts. i92o, art. 2. The more liberal statutes give
the adopted person the same rights as if born to the adoptive parents in lawful
wedlock. *Hurd's Ill. Rev. Sts. igig, ch. 4, sec. 5. The courts seem to reject this
distinction as a determining factor and to hold that under either statute the adopted
person may not take under a devise to "children" unless he can show that the
term was meant to include those who attained that status by adoption as well as
by birth. Middletown v. Gaffey (1921) 96 Conn. 6I, 112 Atl. 689; In re Puter-
baugh's Estate (I918) 261 Pa. 235, io4 At. 6oi; contra: Kales, op. cit. 676. In
the instant case the adoption took place after the death of the testator, and the
testator was not the adoptive parent. The case thus seems to follow the general
trend.
